Howard F. Seybold v. Union Pacific Railroad Company : Brief of Appellant by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)
1951
Howard F. Seybold v. Union Pacific Railroad
Company : Brief of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
Rawlings, Wallace, Black, Roberts & Black; Dwight L. King; Counsel for Plaintiff and Appellant;
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Seybold v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., No. 7641 (Utah Supreme Court, 1951).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/1415
Case ·Na. 7641 · 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
vs. 
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COM-
pANY, a corporation, 
· ·. Defendant and Respondent. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from the District Court of the /Third Judicial 
District, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah 
Honorable Clarence E. Baker, presiding. 
.,~· •\ \ 
RAWLINGS, W ALLAC·E, BLACK; 
ROBERTS & BLACK 
})wiGHT L. KING 
Counsel for Plaintiff and 
Appellant 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ---------------------------------------------------- 1 
STATEMENT OF FACTS ------------------------------------------------------------ 2 
THE CROSSING __ --------------- _ ---------------------------------------------------------- 3 
THE ACCIDENT ------------------------------------------------------------------------'---- 4 
STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED UPON ____________________________ 10 
ARGUMENT ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 10 
POINT I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ENTERING 
JUDGMENT FOR DEFENDANT, NOTWITHSTAND-
ING THE VERDICT IN FAVOR OF PLAINTIFF ________ 10 
POINT II. THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED A JURY 
QUESTION OF WHETHER OR NOT THE DEFEND-
ANT WAS GUILTY OF NEGLIGENCE PROXI-
MATELY CAUSING PLAINTIFF'S INJURIES ________________ 11 
SIGNALS AT THE CROSSING-------------------------------------------------------- 14 
LIGHTS ON CABOOSE -------------------------------------------------------------------- 19 
POSITION OF ENGINE ----------- ________ -- ________ ------------ ________ . _ ------------ ___ 21 
POINT III. THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED A JURY 
QUESTION OF WHETHER OR NOT THE PLAIN-
TIFF WAS GUILTY OF NEGLIGENCE WHICH CON-
TRIBUTED TO PROXIMATELY CAUSE HIS OWN 
INJURIES ______________ ----------------- ___________________________ ---------------------- 22 
CON CL U SI 0 N ______________________________________________ . __ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _______ ____________ __ _ 35 
AUTHORITIES CITED 
Baltimore & 0. R. Co. v. Deneen, 167 F. 2d 799 ________________________ 33 
Burroughs v. Southern Pacific Co., 153 Or. 431, 56 P. 2d 1145 __ 26 
Callaway v. Pickard, (Ga.) 23 S.E. 2d 564____________________________________ 15 
Canham v. Rhode Island Co., 35 Rhode Island 177, 85 Atl. 
1050 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 15 
~Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co. v. Golay, 155 F. 2d 842 ____________________ 15, 27 
Chung Sing v. Southern P.ac. Co., 182 Cal. 609, 189 P. 281. ... 21, 28 
Clark v. Union Pacific R. Co., 70 Utah 29, 25'7 P. 1050 ________ 26, 27 
Colorado & S. Ry. Co. v. Chiles., 50 Colo. 191, 114 P. 661. ___________ 20 
Deister v. Atchison T. & .S. F. Ry. Co., 99 Kan. 525, 162 P. 
282, L.R.A. 1917 C 784 ------------------------------------------------------------ 15 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
AUTHORITIES-(Continued) 
Page 
Engstrom v. Canadian N. R. Co., 153 Minn. 51, 190 N.W. 68 ____ 19 
Evans v. Denver & R. G. W. R. R. Co., 74 Utah 201, 278 P. 
809 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 26 
Frank v. Reading Company, 297 Pa. 233, 146 A. 598 ---------------- 33 
Grand Trunk Ry. Co. v. Ives, 144 U. S. 408, 12 S. Ct. 679, 
36 L. Ed. 485 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 19 
Green v. Southern Pac. Co., 53 Cal. App. 194, 199 P. 1059 ____ 17, 25 
Hines v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 105 Wash. 178, 177 
p. 795 -------------------------------------------------------------------------- __________ 21, 23 
Hinkle v. Southern Pac. Co., 12 Cal. 2d 691, 87 P. 2d 349 ____ 17, 18 
Hough v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 133 Kan. 757, 3 P. 2d 
499 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 32 
Hurley v. Connecticut Co., 118 Conn. 276, 172 Atl. 86 ____________ 15 
Interstate Motor Lines, Inc., v. Great Western Ry. Co., 161 
F. 2d 968 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 17 
Los Angeles & Salt LakeR. Co. v. Lytle, 56 Nev. 192, 47 P. 
2d 934 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 26 
Malizia v. Oregon Short LineR. Co., 53 Utah 122, 178 P. 75'6 35 
Missouri Pacific R. Co. v. Shell (Ark.) 185 S.W. 2d 81. ___________ 30 
Moody v. Canadian N. R. Co., 156 Minn. 211, 194 N.W. 639 ____ 19 
Moses v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 138 Kan. 347, 26 P. 2d 259 ________ 28 
Newton v. Oregon Short Line R. Co., 43 Utah 219, 134 P. 
56 7 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- __ 33, 34 
Peizer v. City of Seattle, 24 P. 2d 444____________________________________________ 15 
Pippy v. Oregon Short Line R. Co., 79 Utah 439, 11 P. 2d 
305 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 27 
Pollard v. Roberson, (Ga.) 6 S.E. 2d 203 ------------------------------------ 15 
Southern Pacific Co. v. Haight, 126 F. 2d 900 ------------------------ 15 
St. Louis-San Francisco R.y. Co. v. Prince, 145 Okla. 194, 
291 p. 973 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 18 
Steed v. Rio Grande Western Ry. Co., 29 Utah 448, 82 P. 476 ____ 35 
Stevens v. Boston Elevated Ry. Co., 184 Mass. 476, 69 N.E. 
338 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 15 
Warner v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company, 168 U. S. 
339, 18 S. Ct. 68, 42 L. Ed. 491 -------------------------------------------- 15 
TEXTS CITED 
2 Wigmore on Evidence., 3rd Ed., Sec. 282, page 132 ---------------- 15 
2 Thompson, Commentaries on Negligence, Section 1650 ________ 26 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
HO\'T ARD F. SEYBOLD, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
l~NION PACIFIC RAILROAD COi\l-
p ANY, a corporation, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
Case No. 
7641 
(All figures in parentheses are the page number of 
the record. The parties will be referred to as they 
appeared in the lower court.) 
This is an appeal by plaintiff (210) from a judgment 
and decree (208) entered by the court after granting 
defendant's motion to set aside verdict and judgment 
entered thereon and to enter judgment for the defendant 
notwithstanding said verdict (207). 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
2 
This was an action to recover damages for personal 
injuries suffered by the plaintiff in a railr<?ad crossing 
accident occurring at Roberts, Idaho, November 14, 1949. 
The case was tried before a jury and a verdict rendered 
in plaintiff's favor in the sum of $1,500.00 (10). 
During the trial of the case the defendant made a 
motion for a directed verdict and the court in denying 
said motion state·d that he believed the case resolved 
itself into a jury question ( 150). After the jury returned 
the foregoing verdict the defendant filed a motion for a 
new trial (205) and a motion for judgment notwithstand-
ing the verdict ( 207) . The trial court by its judgment 
and decree kept under advisement the motion for a new 
trial but granted the motion for a judgment notwith-
standing the verdict of the jury and entered judgment 
in favor of defendant (208). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS· 
This is a usual crossing case in the sense that the 
testimony of plaintiff and the railroad is in direct con-
flict. Plaintiff testified that it was not very easy to see 
and that it was quite dark (22) at the time of the colli-
sion and that the caboose came onto the crossing without 
lights and without warning or signals of any kind. The 
railroad introduced evidence that the crossing was light, 
that bells and gongs were ringing. and lights were on 
the caboose and men were standing on the caboose and 
in the crossing signaling with lights and voice to plain-
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tiff to stop. Since the motion for judgment notwithstand-
ing the verdict was granted the evidence must be viewed 
in its light most favorable to plaintiff. We, therefore, 
in making this statement, will follow this well-established 
rule and state the evidence as presented by plaintiff. 
The accident occurred at the Rigby Crossing at 
Roberts, Idaho, at approximately 7:00 o'clock P.M. on 
the 14th day of November, 1949 (17). The plaintiff was 
driving a truck from Leadore, Idaho, to the auction 
yards- at Idaho Falls. The truck was loaded with eigh-
teen head of beef cattle. It was a 1¥2-ton heavy-use truck 
with a 26-foot semi-trailer. The trailer was attached to 
the cab of the truck (16). The tracks of the defendant 
railroad company run in a north-south direction and 
the highway crosses these tracks at right angles and 
runs east and west. The plaintiff, at the time of the 
collision, was driving in an easterly direction and the 
caboose of the defendant was proceeding south over the 
crossing and was on the so-called passing track. A de-
tailed description of the crossing should here be given. 
THE CROSSING 
In the file is found a pencil diagram, not drawn to 
scale, of the crossing and its immediate surroundings. 
While this was not introduced as an exhibit, it is an 
accurate portrayal of the diagram which was placed on 
the blackboard and referred to by the witnesses during 
the course of the trial. 
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There are three tracks on this crossing, each of 
which runs north and south. The tracks are parallel with 
Highway No. 91. Between 150 and 175 feet south (59) 
of the depot Highway No. 48, running in an east and west 
direction, crosses the three tracks and connects with 
Highway No. 91. Plaintiff was proceeding south on 
Highway 91 and turned east onto Highway No. 48 and 
across the tracks. The three tracks, starting from the 
west, are known as the Team Track, the Passing Track 
and the Main Line Track. The distance from the middle 
of Highway No. 91 to the middle of the Team Track is 
79 feet, from the Team Track to the Passing Track 43 
feet, and from the Passing Track to the Main Line Track 
17 feet. There are red flasher signal lights on each side 
of the. crossing. These signals are 15 feet west of the 
Team Track and 15 feet east of the Main Line Track. 
The depot building itself is north of the crossing and 
east of the tracks. The surroundings are portrayed by 
pictures introduced in evidence as Defendant's Exhibits 
"1" to "6" inclusive. At the time of the collision the 
crossing was shrouded in darkness (22, 38). 
This crossing was e~tensively used. It appeared that 
trucks had been using it all day long on the day of the 
accident ( 136, 139). 
THE AC.CIDENT 
Plaintiff was driving his truck in a southerly direc-
tion on Highway No. 91. He made a left hand turn from 
this highway onto Highway No. 48. He slowed at the 
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intersection, 1nade the turn and stopped at the flasher 
light, 'vhich was in operation (18). He described the 
turn as a ~~rather hard one to make" and estimated his 
speed at about five or six miles per hour and stated that 
the cattle being as top heavy as they "\vere he could not 
negotiate that turn going more than seven or eight miles 
on hour at the most (18). He caused his truck to come 
to a complete stop at this flasher and noted that the 
locomotive was standing on the main line track (18, 38) 
between the depot and the crossing (19). It was headed 
south. He saw the big headlight of the engine shining 
across the crossing in a southerly direction. He estimated 
that the engine "\Vas about 75 feet from the crossing. 
It was not in motion. He knew that the engine on the 
main line track activated the flasher signal at the cross-
ing. Believing that the standing engine was activating 
the flasher he shifted into first gear and started across 
the crossing (19). Because of his knowledge that the 
engine was making the flasher work he considered that 
it was safe to go across the crossing. As he proceeded 
to traverse the crossing, he kept his eyes on the engine 
and the road (20). He did not see anything until the 
light of the engine seemed to black out and then he looked 
up and noticed the caboose. At the time the caboose was 
just a few feet from plaintiff's truck and was· on the 
passing track. He merely got a fleeting glimpse of the 
caboose-not more than a second. He did not notice any 
lights on the caboose and saw no people there. No one 
was on the road as he attempted to trave·rse the cross-
ing (21). 
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Plaintiff detailed the observations he made as he 
proceeded over the crossing on cross-examination as 
follows (39, 40) : 
"Q. Did you look along the passing track to 
your left~ 
"A. It was quite dark there, and that locomo-
tive headlight was flashing across the crossing. I 
looked, I couldn't see anything at that time. 
"Q. Did you look up this track to your leftf 
"A. Yes, I did. 
"Q. You said you didn't see anything~ 
"A. That is right. 
"Q. After you proceeded across, you said you 
saw the caboose just before the collision~ 
"A. Yes, I did. 
"Q. How far away was it~ 
"A. Oh, it was six or seven feet. 
* * * * * 
"Q. Did you see the man at the end of the 
caboose, on the platform~ 
"A. I didn't see a man on the caboose. 
"Q. Did you look at the platform~ 
"A. You don't have much time to look that 
close. 
"Q. Did you look to see if a man was on there f 
"A. Not to look to see if there was a man on 
there. 
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"Q. You would say there was no Inan there~ 
" ..... £\... I would say there was no man there. 
"Q. You would testify there was not a man 
there"? 
''A. Yes. 
"Q. Did you see the lights~ 
'~A. No, sir. 
"Q. You had to look awfully fast~ 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. You would testify there were no lights~ 
"A. Yes, there were no lights. 
"Q. You would say there were no lights on 
the caboose~ 
"A. I would say there were no lights on the 
caboose. 
"Q. There were no lights inside the caboose~ 
"A. No lights. 
"Q. No lights at all~ 
"A. That is right. 
"Q. It was completely dark~ 
"A. That is right." 
Plaintiff testified that there were no lights at this 
crossing and a person cannot see anything; that by the 
time he had gotten as far as he had the arc lights were 
behind him and also the street lights of Roberts and 
there were no bright lights he could see (21). 
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Plaintiff was dazed for a period of time after which 
he made observations as to the relative positions of the 
truck and caboose ( 22). The impact occurred just at the 
rear of the door of the cab on the truck. The caboose, 
after it hit the truck, glanced off and ran up on the 
cattle rack and was hooked there. The rack and cab of 
the truck had turned partly over on its side and the 
caboose was keeping the cab of the truck from going on 
over (22). 
In the collision plaintiff received gashes on his head 
and his left knee and the cartilage of his knee was 
torn (24, 26). 
We will not go into the details of the damages result-
ing to plaintiff from the injuries sustained because the 
only matter of interest on this appeal is whether there 
was sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding of 
liability against the defendant company. 
The defendant introduced in this case what may be 
termed the usual railroad evidence. If the plaintiff 
crossed the crossing unde·r the conditions described by 
defendant's testimony, the only conclusion that reason-
able persons could reach is that plaintiff was attempting 
to commit suicide. 
The conductor of the crew that had charge of this 
caboose testified he was standing in the middle of the 
crossing between the main line and the passing tracks; 
that he was yelling and waiving his electric lamp to 
attract the attention of the plaintiff ( 61, 63). He testi-
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fied that the engine was halfway between the north switch 
and the depot, which would mean that the engine was 
some 400 feet from the crossing at the time the accident 
occurred. Of course, this employee of defendant had to 
ailluit that it was his duty to stand at the crossing to 
conforn1 to the rules of the defendant company under 
the conditions there existing and his failure to be there 
\vould have been grounds for discipline (75). This would 
be a good reason to discredit his testimony, because he 
obviously had a n1otive for testifying as he did (75). 
Howard Kunze, the rear brakeman, testified that he 
was on the south end of the caboose· as it approached the 
crossing (112). Before reaching the crossing he took 
up the slack on the chain to the b~ake preparatory to 
stopping on the other side of the crossing. When he was 
105 feet from the crossing he noticed plaintiff's truck 
(113). The truck at ~that time was going south on High-
way No. 91. After plaintiff made the turn onto High-
way No. 48 he heard the engine of the truck accelerate 
and it came over the crossing (114). He testified he was 
in plain sight, hollering and waving the lantern at the 
plaintiff and then the collision occurred ( 115). 
There were other witnesses for defendant but the 
above is the substance of defendant's case. The jury did 
not believe this testimony but chose to accept the plain-
tiff's testimony and returned a verdict for him. The rail-
road testimony here was just a little too good to be be-
lieved unless it could be established that plaintiff was 
bent on suicide. 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED UPON 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ENTERING JUDGMENT 
FOR DEFENDANT, NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT 
IN FAVOR OF PLAINTIFF. 
POINT ll 
THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED A JURY QUESTION OF 
WHETHER OR NOT THE DEFENDANT WAS GUILTY OF 
NEGLIGENCE PROXIMATELY CAUSING PLAINTIFF'S 
INJURIES. 
POINT III 
THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED A JURY QUESTION OF 
WHETHER OR NOT THE PLAINTIFF WAS GUILTY OF 
NEGLIGENCE WHICH CONTRIBUTED TO PROXIMATELY 
CAUSE HIS OWN INJURIES. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ENTERING JUDGMENT 
FOR DEFENDANT, NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT 
IN FAVOR OF PLAINTIFF. 
The only grounds upon which the trial court could 
have entered judgment in favor of defendant notwith-
standing the jury verdict in favor of plaintiff was either 
(1) that as matter of law the evidence did not support 
a finding of negligence on the part of defendant proxi-
mately causing plaintiff's injuries, or (2) that as matter 
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of la"'" plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence. 
ln order to justify this ruling of the trial court it is 
necessary that reasonable minds could not differ upon 
the propositions p·resented. We submit that the evidence 
in this case presented jury questions on both of these 
propositions and that the trial court erred in its ruling 
granting defendant's motion and in entering judgment 
1n favor of defendant. 
We will discuss the evidence in detail under the 
following points of the brief. There is nothing in the 
record indicating the ground upon which the. trial court 
entered the judgment in favor of defendant. It will, 
therefore, be necessary to discuss each of the proposi-
tions mentioned. 
POINT II 
THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED A JURY QUESTION OF 
WHETHER OR NOT THE DEFENDANT WAS GUILTY OF 
NEGLIGENCE PROXIMATELY CAUSING PLAINTIFF'S 
INJURIES. 
The trial court by its Instruction No. 3 ( 186, 187) 
set forth the six grounds of negligence alleged in plain-
tiff's complaint. By its Instruction No. 8 (192) the court 
instructed the jury that in order to find a verdict for 
plaintiff the jury must find by a preponderance of the 
evidence that defendant was negligent in one or more of 
the particulars set forth in Instruction No. 3. 
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We submit that the evidence in this case supported 
a finding of negligence· upon the grounds mentioned in 
said instructions. However, in order to support plain-
tiff's position that error was committed in ente~ing judg-
ment for defendant it is only necessary that the court 
conclude there was sufficient evidence to support a 
finding that defendant was negligent in one of said 
particulars and that such negligence proximately caused 
injuries to plaintiff. 
The situation which existed at the crossing at the 
time plaintiff attempted to traverse it constituted a 
hazardous condition. The crossing was dark. As plain-
tiff proceeded in an easterly direction, the arc lights 
and the neon signs and lights in the stores west of the 
highway were behind him. The engine formed a dark 
background as it stood on the main line track. The 
caboose as it approache·d the crossing was moving on the 
westerly side of the engine. The engine would create a 
condition making it extremely difficult, if not impossible, 
to see the caboose. The headlight of the engine shone 
south onto the crossing, adding further. to the difficulty 
of seeing the caboose. The caboose was drifting along the 
passing track and would make no noise as it approached 
the crossing. This condition required that precautions 
be taken by the defendant in affording a warning to 
motorists traversing the crossing in an easte·rly direction. 
It would be necessary for some type of signal to be given 
other than merly the flasher signals on either side of the 
tracks. A person approaching this crossing could well 
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belio\ye that the signals "\Vere being activated by the 
engine on the main line track. This being so, further 
signals 'vere necessary. These signals should have been 
in the form of lights on the caboose, thereby making its 
Inoveinent and presence known to persons on the crossing 
or by so1ne person standing on the crossing for the pur-
pose of giving further signals to motorists. As shown 
in the statement of facts, plaintiff testified that there 
were no lights on the caboose ( 40) and there was no 
person standing at or near the crossing giving signals 
for the purpose of having him stop (21). The position of 
the engine approximately 75 feet north of the· crossing 
"\Vas in violation of the rule of the railroad which was 
introduced in evidence as Exhibit "B." 
We submit that this evidence establishes that the 
defendant was guilty of negligence in the manner in 
which it conducted these switching operations over and 
across this crossing. This negligence consisted of a 
failure to give any warning whatsoever of the approach 
of this caboose either by reasonably adequate signals 
or warning at the crossing or by warning with adequate 
lights or audible signal on the caboose itself. The rail-
road was also negligent in placing its engine, in violation 
of its own safety rules, a scant 75 feet from the crossing, 
thereby creating an obstruction to a view of the caboo~e 
as it approached the crossing. 
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SIGNALS· AT THE CROSSING 
We submit a jury could properly find that defen-
dant company, to exercise reasonable care, should have 
stationed a flagman on the crossing under the circum-
stances existing at the time plaintiff attempted to drive 
across. A person could reasonably believe that the flasher 
signal was being activated by the stationary engine on 
the main line track and, hence, the jury could have 
found that this signal was not adequate. The caboose 
with no lights approached on the passing track against 
the dark background of the engine. There was a conflict 
in the evidence as to the presence of a flagman on the 
crossing. Plaintiff testified that there was no flagman 
there and no signal given. We submit that under the 
authorities a jury question was thereby made out. 
The conductor, Ray, admitted on the wittness stand 
that the rules of the defendant company required that 
under the circumstances existing at Roberts he, as con-
ductor, should flag the crossing (75). In direct conflict 
with the testimony of plaintiff this conductor testified 
that he in fact flagged the crossing and was attempting 
to stop plaintiff from traversing the crossing. From 
these circumstances alone· the jury could infer that rea-
sonable care required that the crossing be flagged under 
the conditions then and there existing. The very pur-
pose of this rule was to protect the· railroad company 
not only so far as its own equipment was concerned .but 
also to protect travelers on the highway who might come 
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into collision 'vith the caboose as it silently drifted 
soutlnvard hidden by the dark background of the engine 
and the glare of the headlight. 
The great weight of authority holds that safety rules 
of a railroad company are admissible in evidence for the 
consideration of the jury in determining whether or not 
by violating such rules the railroad company was negli-
gent. See Pollard v. Roberson, (Ga.) 6 S.E. 2d 203; 
Callaway v. Pickard, (Ga.) 23 S.E. 2d 564; Southern 
Pacific Co. v. Haight, 126 F. 2d 900; Peizer v. City of 
Seattle, 24 P. 2d 444; Stevens v. Boston Elevated Ry. 
Co., 184 Mass. 476, 69 N.E. 338; Canham v. Rhode Island 
Co., 35 Rhode Island 177, 85 Atl. 1050; Hurley v. Con-
necticut Co., 118 Conn. 276, 172 Atl. 86; Warner v. 
Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company, 168 U. S. 339, 18 
S. Ct. 68, 42 L. Ed. 491; Deister v. Atchison T. & S. F. Ry. 
Co., 99 Kan. 525, 162 P. 282, L.R.A. 1917 C 784. See 2 Wig-
more on Evidence, 3rd Ed., Sec. 282, at page 132. 
Numerous cases have held that it is negligence unde.r 
certain circumstances to fail to flag a crossing. We sub-
mit that under the authorities the case at bar presents 
such a situation and plaintiff's testimony that no person 
flagged the crossing presents an evidentiary basis for 
a finding of negligence on the part of defendant. The 
Tenth Circuit has had occasion to consider this matter 
of flagging crossings. In Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co. v. 
Golay, 155 F. 2d 842, 844, a collision occurred at a rail-
road crossing in Wyoming. At a crossing where there 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
16 
was an obstruction on the northwest corner, the tracks 
running in an east-west direction and the road in a north-
south direction. The plaintiff's automobile was proceed-
ing southerly and the train easterly. In speaking of the 
relative duties of railroads and travelers on the highways 
the court stated : 
"* * * But the rights of the general public 
and the rights of the railway company at street 
crossings are mutual and reciprocal; and, al-
though common convenience gives to trains pre-
cedence over automobiles in the use of crossings, 
it is upon the condition that the company will give 
due warning of the approach of its train in order 
that those in automobiles may stop safely and 
wait for the trains to pass. What constitutes 
reasonable and timely warning depends upon the 
circumstances and surroundings. For instance, 
the vigilance and care must be greater at cross-
ings in a populous city or town where the travel 
is great than at ordinary crossings in the country. 
And, as a general rule, whether reasonable care 
and prudence require under all the circumstances 
that special warning facilities be maintained at 
a crossing in a city or town is a question of fact 
for the jury." 
In the case at bar there was testimony that con-
siderable traffic had passed orver this crossing during 
the day of the collision ( 136, 139). 
The presence of an undue amount of traffic is not 
essential in order to make a jury question of negligence· 
in failing to have a flagman at a crossing. This is ex-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
17 
emplified by another case of the Tenth Circuit: Inter-
state Motor Lines, Inc., v. Great Western Ry. Co., 161 F. 
2d 968, 972, wherein the court stated: 
"* * * But the In ere fact that a crossing is in 
the country does not necessarily in all circum-
stances relieve the railway company of any duty 
to maintain a special warning signal. If a crossing 
in the country is peculiarly dangerous to travelers 
on account of its location, or mode of construc-
tion, or because the track is curved, or the view is 
obstructed, the railroad company is required in 
the exercise of ordinary care to n1eet the peril 
with a special warning signal such as a- bell, an 
electric wigwag, a flash signal, or other like cau-
tion." 
In speaking of the duty of a railroad to furnish a 
flagman at a crossing the court in Green v. Southern 
Pac. Co., 53 Cal. App. 194, 199 P. 1059, 1062, stated: 
"* * * But the law does impose upon a rail-
road company the duty to use reasonable care, 
corresponding to the circumstances constituting 
the probable danger, to avoid injury to persons 
lawfully traveling upon the public highway 
crossed by the company's tracks and trains. It 
then becomes a question for a jury to decide 
whether or not it was negligence for the company 
to run its cars across the highway without provid-
ing a flagman or some means of warning to 
travelers at the place of crossing." 
The court in Hinkle v. Southern Pac. Co., 12 Cal. 
2d 691, 87 P. 2d 349, 354, pointed out that it was un-
necessary that the traffic at a crossing be extraordinarily 
heavy. In that case it stated: 
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"* * * It is true the crossing is not in a popu .. 
lous city, but it is over a public highway where 
there is much travel to and from a popular sum-
mer resort. Moreover, it is apparent from the 
photographs introduced as exhibits that an un-
obstructed view of the tracks cannot be had until 
one is almost upon them. The fact that a crossing 
is frequently crossed over by travelers is not 
an indispensable factor to a determination that 
a crossing is a particularly dangerous one, but 
the hazardous nature of the crossing may depend 
upon the physical nature of the crossing itself." 
Parenthetically the plaintiff particularly calls the 
Court's attention to this Hinkle case in that the conflict 
in that case was as great as the conflict presented in 
the case at bar. The plaintiff in that case stated that 
he was traversing the crossing when an unlighted back-
ing train loomed out of the trees about 20 feet from his 
automobile. He te!stified that he observed no lights and 
nobody at the crossing. The railroad company intro-
duced evidence that the backing engine was lighted; that 
a member of the crew was on the crossing waving a 
lantern and that plaintiff was drunk. The jury, which 
was the trie.r of the fact, disbelieved this "pat" evidence 
introduced by the railroad company just as the jury in 
the case at bar disregarded the "pat" evidence of the 
Union Pacific. 
The court 1n St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co. v. 
Prince, 145 Okla. 194, 291 P. 973, 977, held that the ab-
sence of a flagman presented a jury question of negli-
gence even in the absence of statute. The court stated: 
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''It is no"T well recognized that the duty may 
exist outside of the statute to provide flagman, 
gates, automatic bells, or other adequate warning 
appliances, if the situation of the c.rossing reason-
ably requires it. And \vhether or not the situation 
of any partjcular crossing requires such additional 
warning, signs, appliances, etc., is a question for 
a jury, where the evidence is such that reason-
able men might reach different conclusions there-
from. Grand Trunk Ry. Co. v. Ives, 144 U. S. 408, 
12 S. Ct. 679, 684, 36 L. Ed. 485." 
It will be noted that the court relied upon Gra.nd 
Trunk Ry. Co. v. Ives, 144 U. s .. 408, 12 S. Ct. 679, 36 
L. Ed. 485. This latter case is one of the leading cases 
on signals at crossings and supports the original ruling 
of the trial court herein that a jury question of negli-
gence for lack of sufficient signal or warning was p-re-
sented. 
See also Engstrom v. Canadian N. R. Co., 153 Minn. 
51, 190 N.W. 68, and Moody v. Canadian N. R. Co., 156 
Minn. 211, 194 N.W. 639. 
LIGHTS ON CABOOSE 
Another method of warning travelers upon the high-
way that a caboose was in the process of being shunted 
along the passing track would be· to place lights thereon 
which would be visible to travelers on the highway. An-
other method would be to station a brakeman on the 
front end of the caboose in order that he might give 
signals both vocal and by light to such travelers. The 
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plaintiff very definitely testified that there were no 
lights and no man upon the caboose ( 40). The defendant 
offered testimony that such lights and such crew member 
were present but the jury could refuse to believe this 
testimony and believe the testimony of plaintiff. 
The failure to light the caboose would be a part of 
the whole situation presented at the crossing. It may be 
that if adequate lights had been on the caboose it would 
not have been necessary to place a flagman on the cross-
ing. However, as part of the negligence of the railroad 
company plaintiff relies upon its failure to have the 
caboose sufficiently lighted so that a traveler on the 
highway would become aware of its presence. The head-
light of the engine glaring upon the crossing in the eyes 
of the traveler as he looked to the north would prevent 
the traveler seeing a caboose shrouded in darkness drift-
ing into the crossing. 
The duty of the railroad in the case of shoving a car 
over a crossing is stated in Colorado & 8. Ry. Co. v. 
Chiles, 50 Colo. 191, 114 P. 661, 664, as follows: 
"~ * * It is the duty of a railway company in 
backing a train over such a crossing to employ 
some reasonable me,ans to warn travelers that the 
train is about to be backed over the crossing. 
Some authorities say that it is the duty of the 
company to have a brakeman on the rear end who 
can signal the engineer as well as the endangered 
traveler. Certain it is that some reasonable means 
looking to the protection of the traveler should 
be employed." 
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We submit that cases where the shoving of a rail-
road car is involved are analogous to the situation in 
the case at bar. 
In speaking of a similar situation the court in Hines 
v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 105 Wash. 178, 177 P. 
795, 797, stated: 
"* * * Indeed, we see no room for any such 
contention, (that defendant was not neglige:nt) in 
view of the fact that the locomotive was running 
backwards at such a rate of speed over this coun-
try crossing, with no headlight on the rear of the 
tender, indicating that it was running in that di-
rection, and no other lights upon it other than, 
possibly, the red and white lanterns which were 
on the rear of the tender, and which would not 
suggest to an observer of reasonable caution, even 
if he saw either of them, that the engine was 
running in that direction at such a place as on a 
main line track, out in the country, over a road 
crossing." 
See also Chung Sing v. Southern Pac. Co., 182 Cal. 
609' 189 p. 281. 
POSITION OF ENGINE 
The evidence would support a finding that the 
engine was standing on the main line track 75 feet from 
the crossing at the time plaintiff stopped his truck pre-
paratory to traversing the crossing. This was in vio-
lation of defendant's Rule 803(A) pleaded (4) and intro-
duced in evidence as E~bit "B" (204). 
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While this engine was not between plaintiff and 
the caboose it was just as effective in obliterating an 
adequate view of the caboose as if it were. Its position 
together with its headlight created a condition which 
prevented plaintiff from seeing the unlighted caboose 
until it was too late. Its presence there tended to attract 
plaintiff's attention to the engine. He would naturally 
watch this engine as he slowly traversed the crossing. 
Authorities ab.ove cited establish that this rule and 
its violation could be considered in determining defend-
ant's negligence. Other factors at the crossing here:to-
fore discussed under this point necessitate a conclusion 
that the placing of the engine in this position under the 
circumstances could support a finding of negligence in so 
doing. 
We submit that defendant's negligence was properly 
left to the jury and error was later committed by enter-
ing judgment for defenda~t. 
POINT III. 
THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED A JURY QUESTION OF 
WHETHER OR NOT THE PLAINTIFF WAS GUILTY OF 
NEGLIGENCE WHICH CONTRIBUTED TO PROXIMATELY 
CAUSE HIS OWN INJURIES. 
The situation presented at this crossing as plaintiff 
attempted to cross it constituted a trap with the engine 
forming a dark background for the drifting caboose and 
with its headlight glaring onto the crossing. Plaintiff 
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was unable to adequately see the passing track or the 
caboose. The fact that the flashing signals were being 
activated would not necessarily require an ordinary 
prudent person to wait lmtil they had stopped. As plain-
tiff approached the crossing from the east he stopped 
and at that time observed the stationary engine on the 
main line track, which he could reasonably conclude was 
activating the signals. The placing of the engine in this 
position with its headlight shining on the crossing and 
the movement of the unlighted caboose in the southerly 
direction without warning of its approach constituted 
a chain of circumstances based upon defendant's negli-
gence which prevented plaintiff from realizing the 
dangerous condition which this crossing presented. 
That the n~gligence of the defendant may be taken 
into consideration in determining whether or not plaintiff 
was contributorily negligent is well established by the 
cases. An interesting discussion of this problem is con-
tained in the case of Hines v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R·y. 
Co., 105 Wash. 178, 177 P. 795, 797, wherein the court 
stated: 
"Counsel for respondent seek to have us shut 
our eyes to the question of its negligence, and 
proceed upon the theory that such negligence is 
not a subject for proper inquiry at this time, 
since they are relying upon the contributory negli-
gence of appellant to defeat his recovery. This 
view of the case we cannot assent to. This is one 
of those cases where the- question of appellant's 
contributory negligence is intimately related to 
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the question of respondent's negligenc_e, since it 
was the negligent acts of respondent which largely 
induced appellant to act as he did. When re-
spondent's servants failed to give such sign_als 
by sound or lights as would attract the attention 
of one about to pass over this country crossing, 
indicating that the locomotive was running in that 
direction, it clearly was guilty of negligence; and 
such negligence becomes little short of a control-
ling factor in determining whether or not appel-
lant was guilty of contributory negligence in act-
ing as he did. As was well said by Judge Fuller-
ton in Hull v. Seattle, Renton & Southern R. Co., 
60 Wash. 162, 167, 110 Pac. 804, 806 : 
" 'A victim of an accident is entitled to have 
his conduct judged by the circumstances surround-
ing him at the time of the accident-by the con-
ditions as they appeared to one in his then situa-
tion-and if his conduct, when so judged, appears 
to be that of a reasonably prudent person, he 
cannot be said to be guilty of negligence.' 
"This is not only the rule applicable generally 
to contributory negligence, but it has peculiar 
force and application to conditions which are the 
creations of a defendant relying upon the contri-
butory negligence of the injured person to escape 
responsibility, when such conditions would natur-
ally influence the action of the person charged 
with contributory negligence. This is the principle 
upon which our decision in Richmond v. Tacoma 
R. & Power Co., 67 Wash. 444, 122 Pac. 351, was 
largely rested; which dealt with a situation we 
' think, even less favorable to the injured person 
than that 'vith which 've are here dealing. 
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~,,,7 e are also to re1nen1ber that this is not a 
case 'vhere 've are asked to decide negatively that 
there is not sufficient evidence of negligence on 
the part of respondent to warrant recovery; but 
"'"e are asked to decide affirmatively that it has 
been conclusively proven that appellant was guilty 
of contributory negligence-a question as to which 
the burden of proof rested upon respondent. As 
pointed out in the Richmond Case, greater cau-
tion is to be e-xercised in deciding as a matter of 
law that a fact which the law requires to be af-
firmatively proven has been conclusively proiVen 
than in merely deciding as a ·matter of law, nega-
tively, that a fact has not been proven. It seems to 
us that there is greater danger of invading the 
province of the jury in the former than in the 
latter case. That contributory negligence is an 
affirmative defense, casting the burden of proof 
upon the defendant to establish it, is the well-
settled law of this state. Benson v. English Lum-
ber Co., 71 Wash. 616, 622, 129 Pac. 403." 
That a dark background may eliminate contributory 
negligence in failing to see an approaching train is de-
clared in Green v. Southern Pac. Co., 53 Cal. App. 194, 
199 P. 1059, 1061. In describing the situation existing 
there the court stated: 
"* * * It must be remembered, however, that 
these incidents occurred in the dusk of evening, 
when the clearness and certainty of daytime light 
were absent; that the icehouse was in the back-
ground of the car as it approached; and therefore 
that there is some room for doubt as to the degree 
in which it 1nay be said that the view was clear 
and unobstructed. This court cannot know to what 
extent the daylight had faded." 
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See also Los Angeles & Salt Lake R. Co. v. Lytle, 
56 Nev. 192, 47 P. 2d 934, in which case the court held 
the negligence of the driver of the automobile was for 
the jury where the railroad left a black gondola coal car 
on a dark crossing. Also Burroughs v. Southern Pacific 
Co., 153 Or. 431, 56 P. 2d 1145. 
The case at bar is more favorable to plaintiff than 
Clark v. Union Pacific R. Co., 70 Utah 29, 47, 257 P. 1050. 
In that case there was no evidence that plaintiff looked 
or listened before he attempted to cross a crossing in 
a heavy fog. The lack of signals of the approaching train 
and the inability to see the train through the fog con-
stituted a situation making the automobile driver's negli-
gence a question of fact for the jury. A quotation in 
that case from 2 Thompson, Commentaries on Negligence, 
Section 1650, is particularly applicable here, to wit: 
"But whether it is .negligent in him (the 
travele,r) to fail to look and listen where, the view 
is obstructed or where there are complicated cir-
cumstances calculated to deceive and throw him 
off his guard, presents a question for the jury." 
Evans v. Denver & R. G. W. R. R. Co., 74 Utah 201, 
206, 278 P. 809 also supports plaintiff's contention here. 
In that case the train was backed over a crossing at night 
without lights or warning. It was held that it could nort, 
as a matter of law, be said that plaintiff saw the cars 
standing or in motion prior to the collision. The question 
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of pl~tiff's ~ontributory negligence 'vas there properly 
left to the jury. In comparing that case with the Clark 
case, supra, the court stated: 
'"* * * The t\YO cases are alike, in that the 
view of the driver of the approaching automobile 
was obstructed, in one case by a fog, in the other 
by darkness." 
See also Pippy v. Oregon Short LineR. Co., 79 Utah 
439, 11 p. 2d 305. 
In Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. v. Golay, 155 F. 2d 842, 
847, the defendant contended that the driver of the auto-
mobile involved in the crossing accident was guilty of 
contributory negligence as matter of law. The appellate 
court held that such was not the case and in discussing 
the evidence stated as follows: 
"* * * In a case of this kind, contributory 
negligence seldom depends upon a single fact or 
circumstance. Ordinarily, it depends upon many 
relevant facts and surrounding circumstances, 
and upon inferences fairly to be drawn from the 
testimony produced. Viewed in that lig~t, we find 
no warrant for holding that reasonable minded 
persons would necessarily reach the conclusion 
that plaintiffs were at fault in failing to see the 
train in time for the automobile to be stopped 
before reaching the crossing, that Fre.d Golay was 
at fault in failing to stop the car, and that Ruth 
Golay was likewise at fault in failing to warn her 
husband of the approach of the train. In short, 
we think the question of contributory negligence 
was for the jury." 
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Contention that contributory negligence was estab-
lished as matter of law was made in Chung Sing v. South-
ern Pac. Co., 182 Cal. 609, 189 P. 281, 282. The court 
held it was a jury question and stated : 
"As to the second point, that of contributory 
negligence, it appears that the accident occurred 
on an evening in November when it was beginning 
to get dusk. The train crew already had their 
lanterns lit. The plaintiff was coming along Santa 
Fe street, driving a two-horse wagon. The con-
tention of the defendants is that the plaintiff 
could and should have seen the car coming as he 
approached the crossing in ample time to stop, 
and that one of the switchmen was protecting the 
crossing and signal4lg to traffic to stop. The 
testimony of the plaintiff is, however, direct that 
he approached the crossing slowly, and saw the 
car standing still, at least as he supposed, and 
then suddenly it came at him from across the 
street. If this be true, and the jury was entitled 
to believe it, there was no negligence on his part in 
attempting to cross, unless he disregarded the 
warning of the switchman. But as to such warning 
there is a decided conflict, and the jury were en-
titled to find against the defendants on this point 
as well. It follows that it cannot be said that the 
verdict is not sustained by the evidence. Judg-
ment affirmed." 
Another case closely paralleling the case at bar on 
the question of the contributory negligence is the case 
of Moses v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 138 Kan. 347, 26 P. 
2d 259, 261. The defendant in that case backed a string of 
cars across a highway in the nighttime without light on 
j 
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the advancing cars and without sounding a warning of 
any kind. The court in considering the evidence and 
reaching its conclusion that a question of fact was pre-
sented stated: 
~~* * * The testimony of plaintiff was that 
\vhen he approached the track he both looked and 
listened for trains and cars and that he neither 
saw nor heard any until he came within about ten 
feet of the track. One taking these precautions 
might reasonably assume that he could cross the 
track without danger. He had no right to antici-
pate that a train would be pushed or pulled over 
the crossing in the nighttime without lights or 
warning of some kind. If the brakeman had been 
posted on the end of the advancing string of cars 
with a swinging lantern, it would have consti-
tuted some warning to the plaintiff, and if such 
a precaution had been taken, probably the cas-
ualty would have been averted. It is urged that 
plaintiff might have stopped his automobile after 
discovering the approaching cars when he was 
within ten or twelve feet of the track. According 
to the testimony he attempted to do so and 
whether his failure to do so on that limited space 
and time was contributory negligence was a fair 
question for the determination of the jury. This 
court is not warranted in declaring as a matter of 
law that his failure to do so in the brief time and 
space available constituted contributory negli-
gence." 
The fact that flasher signals were in operation does 
not require a finding that plaintiff failed to exercise 
ordinary care for his own safety. As heretofore ex-
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plained, the plaintiff thought, and could in the exercise 
of reasonable care think, that the flasher was being acti-
vated by the stationary engine standing upon the main 
line track 75 feet to the north of the crossing. In fact 
the e·ngine was causing the flasher light to operate (19). 
Plaintiff then proceeded to cross and was hit by a caboose 
which came out from the darkness created by the engine 
and the headlight. In point on this question is the case 
of Missouri Pacific R. Co. v. Shell, (Ark.) 185 S.W. 2d 
81, wherein an automobile with four occupants was in-
volved in a crossing accident with a passenger train. 
All four occupants of the automobile were killed. As the 
automobile approached the crossing it could be observed 
that there were locomortives standing on each side of the 
highway and the blinker lights were in operation. Evi-
dence established that the presence of at least one of 
these locomotives was sufficient to cause these lights to 
flash. The headlights of both engines were burning. 
The court held that the driver of the automobile and the 
passengers were not guilty of contributory negligence 
as matter of law. In reaching this conclusion the court 
stated: 
"Numerous cases in which it was held that 
one injured in a collision at a railroad crossing 
was precluded from recovering are cited by ap-
pellants, bu~ no~e of ithem presents exactly the 
same fact situation as the case at bar. 'No in-
flexible rule can be laid down as to when or under 
what .circ~stances a traveler at a public railroad 
crossrng will be free from contributory negligence 
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in going over the crossing; but each case must 
neeessarily depend upon its own particular facts.' 
Smith v. ~fissouri Pacific Railroad Con1pany, 138 
Ark. 589, 211 S.,,r. 657, 658. 
"Under the testimony presented in this case 
the question of contributory negligence on the part 
of the occupants of the auton1obile was one for 
the jury to decide. * * * 
~',Vhile the warning lights were flashing when 
these men drove on the crossing, it appears that 
there were two locomotives, one standing on each 
side of the crossing and facing the crossing, and 
there was testimony that one of these would have 
set the 'blinker' signal to operating. The jury 
might have concluded that this led the occupants 
of the auton1obile to assrune that the signal was 
being operated as a result, of the proximity of 
one of the locomotives standing near the crossing 
and that, for that reason, failure to heed this 
warning was not necessarily negligent. 
"It is, of course, the duty of anyone driving 
a vehicle, in approaching a railroad crossing, to 
look and listen for an approaching train before 
crossing the track, and to stop the vehicle, if it 
becomes necessary to do so, in order to look and 
listen. It is undisputed that Shell, in approaching 
the crossing, was driving very slowly, but there 
was no testimony as to whether or not he or any 
of the other occupants of the automobile looked 
or listened for a train. The switch engine was 
standing on a spur track, near the main line, about 
400 feet down the track in the direction of the 
approaching passenger. Several witnesses-one 
introduced by appellants-testified that the head-
light of this standing switch engine was burning. 
The jury may have considered that the presence 
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of the two locomotives, which were standing still, 
coupled with the failure of the ?·pera~ors of the 
passenger train to give the require~ signal~, cre-
ated a situation which did nOit establish negligence 
on the part of the driver of the automobile in 
proceeding to cross the track slowly." 
In Hough v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 133 Kan. 
757, 3 P. 2d 499, 501, a judgment for plaintiff in a cross-
ing case was affirmed. At the time the plaintiff's auto-
mobile attempted to traverse the crossing a wigwag ap-
pliance was in operation. A train was in the vicinity of 
the crossing which could have activated the signal. An-
other train came along and collided with the plaintiff's 
automobile. In holding that the question of plaintiff's 
contributory negligence was one for the jury the court 
stated: 
"The principal question presented by the de-
fendant is t.hat the injury and loss sustained by 
plaintiff was due to his own negligence. The 
negligence attributed to plaintiff is based mainly 
on the fact that the wigwag was in operation and 
the gong thereon ringing when plaintiff undertook 
to drive across the tracks laid over the street. It 
is argued that the wigwag and gong in operation 
was a notice to plaintiff that there 'was a train 
in the vicinity, and that he should have waited 
until the bell stopped ringing. The wigwag with 
a bell ringing is not always a certain signal that 
a train is approaching a crossing or that there 
is a_ present danger in passing the crossing. A 
moVIng or standing train in any part of the block 
would start the operation of the bell and continue 
as long as the car was within the zone. The at-
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tachn1ents "rere such that a train standing or nlov-
ing in the zone as much as 1,200 feet away from 
the crossing would cause the ringing of the bell, 
and the appliance 1night be jn operation a con-
siderable time without a train approaching the 
crossing or even an intention to propel it ove,r the 
crossing. The ringing of that bell was of course 
notice to the traveler that a train was moving or 
standing somewhere within the block, and warned 
him to look out for trains approaching the cross-
ing, but did not require him to wait there in-
definitely while the bell was ringing." 
The court quoted fron1 Frank v. Reading Company, 
297 Pa. 233, 146 A. 598, 599, as follows: 
"* * * Evidence as to ringing of crossing bells 
may be shown as proof of contributory negligence, 
but is ordinarily for the jury. Such evidence can-
not be accepted as showing that defendant has 
discharged its duty, nor is it conclusive that a 
pedestrian or a driver must know a train is coming 
and should be governed accordingly. Here there 
is no evidence to show the ringing of this particu-
lar bell came from the approach of the train that 
caused the accide·nt." 
To the same effect on principle see Newton v. 
Oregon Short Line R. Co., 43 Utah 219, 134 P. 567, and 
Baltimore & 0. R. Co. v. Deneen, 167 F. 2d 799. 
In the case at bar the flasher signals were not being 
activated by the caboose which hit plaintiff's truck (74). 
The uncontradicted evidence is that the standing engine 
on the main line track activated them (19, 74). 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
''4 ,) 
True it is that plaintiff did not wait a half hour 
but how was he to know that a car was moving on the 
passing track~ Would he be required to wait when from 
all appearances the standing engine, which did not hit 
him, was activating the signals~ 
The language of this Court in Newton v. Oregon 
Short LineR. Co., 43 Utah 219, 226 134 P. 567, is applic-
able here: 
"Where, therefore, the circumstances are such 
that it may reasonably he said that different 
minds, in viewing and considering the evidence, 
might arrive at different conclusions with respect 
to whether or not the injured person exercised 
ordinary care, the question of negligence must of 
necessity be determined as one of fact and not of 
law. While the substance of the foregoing state-
ment is often found in the books and may be said 
to be a correct statement of the doctrine, yet such 
statements often leave the reader in doubt whether 
a given case falls within or without the doctrine. 
But, notwithstanding this, it is impossible to form-
ulate a rule by which all cases can be determined. 
"All that can be said is that, unless the ques-
tion of negligence is free from doubt, the court 
cannot pass upon it as a question of law; that is, 
if after considering all the evidence and the in-
ferences that rnay be deduced therefrom the court 
is in doubt whether reasonable men in viewing 
a~d considering all the evidence, mi~ht arrive at 
different conclusions, then this very doubt deter-
mines the question to be one of fact for the jury 
and not one of law for the court. The court can 
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pass upon the question of negligence only in clear 
cases. Alt others should be submitted to the jury. 
The reason of this is apparent from the fact that 
in this state all questions of fact are for the jury; 
and therefore, unless it is clear that in viewing 
and considering the evidence reasonable minds 
might not arrive at different conclusions, the case 
should go to the jury." 
To the same effect see Malizia v. Oregon Short Line 
R. Co., 53 Utah 122, 178 P. 756; Steed v. Rio Grande 
Western Ry. Co., 29 Utah 448, 82 P. 476. 
We submit that the question of plaintiff's contribu-
tory negligence was one for the jury to determine and 
under the circumstances it in fact found that plaintiff 
was not guilty of contributory negligence. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court by entering its judgment for defend-
ant contrary to the jury's verdict denied to plaintiff his 
right of trial by jury. Its ruling is, jn effect, a directed 
verdict for defendant. Only if reasonable minds cannot 
differ upon the two propositions of defendant's negli-
gence and plaintiff's contributory negligence. can this rul-
ing be correct. That eight jurors reached a result con-
trary to the trial court is certainly some evidence that 
reasonable minds can differ upon these propositions. 
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It is a serious undertaking to set aside a jury verdict on 
the basis that all reasonable minds must conclude that 
the eight jurors were~ entirely wrong. 
We submit that the judgment of the trial court should 
be reversed and the case remanded for further pro-
ceedings. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RAWLINGS, W ALLAC·E, BLACK, 
ROBERTS & BLACK 
DWIGHT L. KING 
Counsel for Plaintiff and 
Appellant 
530 Judge Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Received ----- --------------- cop1es of the within Brief of 
Appellant this -------------------- day of August, A. D. 1951. 
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